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CREDIBILITY AND




Central Bank of Chile
After a long history of high and volatile inflation, the Central Bank 
of Chile began implementing its monetary policy in the early 1990s 
by announcing yearly targets for inflation. This new framework was 
the first step toward a full-fledged inflation-targeting setup, although 
the Central Bank continued to pursue an explicit objective for the 
exchange rate. One year before the first announced inflation target 
in 1990, the Central Bank was granted autonomy through a special 
law that explicitly states that the main objective of monetary policy 
is to ensure price stability. 
Some authors argue that by enhancing the credibility of monetary 
policy, this new institutional framework contributed fundamentally to 
lowering inflation to its current level of around 3 percent (Corbo, 1998; 
Morandé, 2002; Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner, 2002).1 Credibility affects 
the dynamics of price adjustments and, in general, the underlying 
process that determines inflation. Credibility may also determine 
the tradeoffs faced by the monetary authority when implementing 
its policy. In particular, a more credible monetary authority should 
face an improved tradeoff between inflation and output stabilization, 
making it less costly to carry out a stabilization process.
In this paper, we provide new evidence of changes in the 
dynamics of the Chilean inflationary process in recent years. Based 
 We thank Douglas Laxton, Felipe Morandé, and Carl Walsh for comments and 
Marcelo Ochoa for his efficient collaboration. The views expressed are those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank of Chile.
1. Other possible factors in the success of the disinflationary process in Chile include 
favorable productivity shocks (see, for example, De Gregorio, 2003).
Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edited by Frederic Mishkin and 
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on a new Keynesian Phillips curve, we show that price rigidity has 
increased in the last few years, while the degree of indexation in 
the economy—based on past inflation—has decreased. We also show 
that the exchange rate pass-through into traded goods inflation has 
decreased. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the credibility 
of monetary policy has increased over time. We argue that as monetary 
policy has become more credible, costly price adjustments have been 
carried out less frequently, and the prevalence of indexation based on 
past inflation has decreased.
These changes in the inflationary process, triggered by the 
enhanced credibility, may have had significant repercussions in 
the way monetary policy is implemented in Chile. As we show in 
Céspedes and Soto (2005), when credibility is low, a central bank that 
is concerned with the sacrifice ratio during a disinflationary process 
may be less aggressive in implementing its monetary policy in order 
to avoid large output losses. As it gains credibility, the central bank 
may fight inflation deviation from target strongly.
This paper presents evidence of a structural change in the policy 
rule that characterizes the conduction of the monetary policy. Our 
evidence is consistent with the idea that monetary policy in Chile has 
been operating in an environment of improved credibility over the last 
several years. We show that the monetary policy rule has become more 
forward-looking in terms of inflation and more aggressive in fighting 
deviations of inflation from the target. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes 
the different phases of the monetary policy regime in Chile since the 
Central Bank was granted independence, with a focus on the two phases 
of the inflation-targeting regime that started in 1991. In section 2, 
we discuss what credibility means and present some preliminary 
evidence on the change in the Central Bank’s degree of credibility. In 
section 3, we show how this change in the degree of credibility could 
have affected the inflationary process in Chile by modifying the degree 
of price stickiness and the extent of indexation to past inflation. The 
fourth section presents estimated monetary policy rules for different 
subsamples, and section 5 concludes.
1. EVOLUTION OF THE INFLATION-TARGETING FRAMEWORK 
IN CHILE
In the period 1991–2005, the Chilean economy grew at an average 
rate of 5.7 percent per year. The inflation rate fell from levels close to 
30 percent in early 1991 to stationary levels around 3 percent by the 
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end of the 1990s, and it has fluctuated around that figure since then 
(see figure 1). During this period, the Central Bank of Chile began 
to announce an explicit target for inflation, a practice that has been 
credited with providing a sound guide for conducting monetary policy.2 
Nevertheless, the whole monetary policy framework underwent 
significant changes along the way. In the first phase (1991–99), the 
macroeconomic framework included not only inflation targets, but also 
targets for the current account deficit and a managed exchange rate. 
In the second phase (2000 to date), the Central Bank implemented a 
full-fledged inflation-targeting regime in which inflation is the main 
policy objective, with no other explicit targets.
Figure 1. Effective Inflation and Inflation Targets in Chile, 
1991–2005
Source: Authors' calculations based on Central Bank of Chile data.
The Central Bank announced the first target range for inflation 
in September 1990, after being granted independence in 1989. The 
initial target, a 15–20 percent target range for December 1991, was 
defined for consumer price index (CPI) inflation. The initial inflation 
target was set over a rather short time horizon and represented a 
strong commitment to reducing inflation. The short-term inflation 
target reflected the need to generate credibility for the new regime. 
Previous poor inflation performance had led to a widespread indexation 
2. See Corbo (1998) on the effects of inflation targeting on Chilean inflation 
dynamics in the 1990s.
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of the economy and high inflation expectations (see Schmidt-Hebbel 
and Tapia, 2002). The stabilization process was thus very gradual to 
avoid high output losses in the context of this widespread indexation 
and low credibility (Massad, 2003). 
In addition to the annual inflation targets, the Central Bank 
implemented a target band for the exchange rate during the first phase 
(1991–99). The band was perceived as the appropriate instrument 
for achieving a normal functioning of the external payments system. 
The Central Bank also set targets for the current account deficit. To 
retain the possibility of managing the exchange rate with monetary 
policy independence, the Bank maintained regulations on the capital 
account, including a nonremunerated reserve requirement for capital 
inflows. Exchange rate market interventions were conducted during 
this period to sustain the exchange rate band. Significant modifications 
to the exchange rate band were also applied, including adjustments 
in its width and one-time realignments.
Since 2000, Chile has operated a flexible inflation-targeting 
regime with the objective of keeping the CPI inflation rate between 
2 and 4 percent over a two-year horizon. The move to a full-fledged 
inflation-targeting framework was seen as the natural step after 
reaching the steady-state level of inflation and establishing sufficient 
credibility. It was triggered, in part, by the macroeconomic outcomes 
of the Asian crisis. GDP growth fell significantly in 1998–99, while 
the annual inflation rate dropped from 4.6 percent in 1998 to 2.3 
percent in 1999. These events led the monetary policy authority to 
substantially enhance its macroeconomic framework. The main new 
elements were the adoption of a free-floating exchange rate regime, 
the deepening of the foreign exchange derivatives market, and the 
total opening of the capital account (see Morandé, 2002; Céspedes, 
Ochoa, and Soto, 2005). In addition, transparency increased 
significantly with the publication of a regular inflation report and 
the public release of policy meeting minutes.
2. HAS CREDIBILITY IMPROVED IN CHILE?
Answering the question of whether credibility has improved in 
Chile is difficult, as there are no direct measures of credibility. The 
literature has not yet reached a unanimous definition of the concept 
of credibility itself, and most of the proposed definitions have an 
important subjective component. Consequently, practical measures 
are not readily available. 
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2.1 What Credibility Means
The academic literature identifies a central bank’s credibility 
as incentive compatibility, precommitment, or strong aversion to 
inflation. Barro and Gordon (1983) hold that a central bank is credible 
if it attains higher payoffs (utility) by following its promised actions 
rather than reneging. Economic agents expect the central bank to 
do exactly what it promised because that increases its own payoff. 
This logic is behind Walsh’s proposal for an optimal contract design 
for central bankers that would make the fight against inflation more 
efficient (Walsh, 1995). By making incentives compatible with the 
fight against inflation through an explicit contract, this mechanism 
ensures the credibility of the monetary authority’s promises. In the 
absence of such a contract, credibility could be reached by means of 
a (credible) precommitment technology, although this could imply 
having institutional arrangements that are not always available. 
Finally, credibility has been associated with a strong aversion to 
inflation. This last definition seems tautological, however: one cannot 
determine whether the monetary authority really has a strong aversion 
to inflation unless one can determine how credible the aversion to 
inflation is. Moreover, having a strong aversion to inflation does not 
ensure that a central bank has the means to reach its objectives.
Blinder (1999) surveys a group of central bankers and academics 
to explore why credibility is important and how central banks can 
enhance their credibility. Although he does not ask participants to 
define credibility, he asks how close the concept of credibility is to 
“dedication to price stability.” Nearly 90 percent of the respondents 
answered that the two factors are quite closely related.
The main argument for why the Central Bank of Chile may have 
gained credibility over the 1990s hinges precisely on this notion of 
credibility. The new constitutional charter of 1989 not only guaranteed 
the Central Bank autonomy from the government, but also explicitly 
established stabilizing the value of the national currency as one of the 
Bank’s two main objectives. In other words, one of the Bank’s explicit 
objectives is price stability.
Autonomy, however, may not be enough to guarantee credibility. 
Posen (1998) and Fischer (1994), for example, find a positive correlation 
between the sacrifice ratio and an index of central bank independence. 
This result seems to suggest that more autonomous central banks 
are not necessarily more credible. It may be more relevant “to match 
deeds and words” (Blinder, 1999). 
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Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) undertake an international 
cross-section comparison of inflation performance for several 
inflation-targeting central banks. They find that for different 
measures of inflation deviations from target, Chile ranks among the 
most accurate inflation targeters in the sample of nineteen countries. 
At least from an international perspective, the Central Bank of Chile 
has fulfilled its promises.
The question, then, is whether this behavior has been consistent 
over time. Figure 2 presents two measures of inflation deviations 
from target for Chile since 1991. In one of the measures, we consider 
the center of the target range as the authority’s objective, while in 
the other, we assume that inflation has not deviated from the target 
if it stays within the target range. In both cases, we report the 
deviation and the absolute value of the deviation. The figure clearly 
illustrates that the Central Bank was less accurate in hitting the 
target in the early 1990s.3 It improved by the mid-1990s, when the 
economy entered a phase of sustained growth and low inflation. The 
Central Bank’s performance in terms of hitting the midpoint of the 
target range worsens after the Russian crisis, when inflation fell 
more than 2 percent below the target. Over the last several years, 
however, the Central Bank has generally managed to keep inflation 
within the target range.
2.2 A Direct Measure of Credibility
One direct measure of credibility is the difference between private 
inflation expectations and the announced target. This credibility 
measure is consistent with the measure discussed by Faust and 
Svensson (2001) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). The latter paper 
defines credibility as the absolute value of the difference between 
the policymaker’s plans and the private sector’s beliefs about those 
plans. The smaller this difference, the higher the credibility of planned 
monetary policy. 
To construct this measure of credibility, we consider two measures 
of expected inflation. The first is based on nominal-real market interest 
rate differentials. The second is a measure of expectation taken from 
survey data. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the difference between 
expected inflation constructed using market interest rates and the 
3. Some authors normalize the deviation of inflation from target by the inflation 
target level.
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Figure 2. Inflation Deviation from Target in Chile, 1991–2005
  A. Deviations  B. Absolute deviations
  of inflation from  of inflationfrom 
  mid-point target  mid-point target
    D. Absolute deviations
  C. Deviations of inflation   of inflation
  from target range  from target range
Source: Authors' calculations based on Central Bank of Chile data.
announced inflation target. The figure shows that credibility increased 
in the early 1990s. However, expected inflation was way above the 
announced target during the Asian crisis, signaling a possible decrease 
in credibility. Since the end of the 1990s, expected inflation has been 
lower than the midpoint of the announced target, but inside the target 
range (except for 2004). In other words, the credibility of the announced 
target seems to have increased over the last several years.
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This credibility measure, based on market expectations extracted 
from interest rate differentials, is subject to two important criticisms. 
First, the level and volatility of inflation were much higher in the early 
1990s than at the end of the decade. That implies that the expected 
inflationary premium implicit in the nominal interest rate was also 
higher in the early 1990s. Consequently, the difference between 
expected inflation and the announced target may not have decreased 
over time. Second, although nominal instruments have existed for 
a long time, the market turnover was pretty low until 2001, when 
monetary policy was nominalized.4 In other words, the market for 
nominal instruments was not very liquid until recently. Therefore, 
Figure 3. Inflation Target Credibility in Chile, 1991–2005: 
Expected Inflation Measured as Nominal-Real Interest Rate 
Differentials
    B. Deviation of inflation 
  A. Inflation expectations  expectations
  and target midpoints  from target midpoint 
  C. Absolute deviation  D. Absolute deviation
  of inflation expectations   of inflation expectations 
  from target midpoint  from target range
Source: Authors' own calculations.
4. In addition to defining an overnight nominal interest rate as its monetary policy 
instrument, the Central Bank introduced a set of nominal instruments in August 2001 
to help set benchmarks for that market.
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prices do not necessarily reflect market expectations on inflation.
Figure 4 charts the difference between private inflation 
expectations and the announced target using survey data. Survey 
data on analyst expectations regarding future inflation, drawn from 
Consensus Forecast, are available for Chile only since 1993. When 
using this measure of expectations, we observe that expected inflation 
has generally been much closer to the midpoint of the inflation target. 
Until 2002, expected inflation was above the midpoint of the target 
(except in 1999). Since that year, expected inflation has been below 
the midpoint of the target, but always inside the target range.5 
Figure 4. Inflation Target Credibility in Chile, 1991–2005: 
Expected Inflation from Consensus Forecast
    B. Deviation of inflation 
  A. Inflation expectations  expectations
  and target midpoints  from target midpoint 
  C. Absolute deviation  D. Absolute deviation
  of inflation expectations   of inflation expectations 
  from target midpoint  from target range
Source:  Authors' calculations based on Central Bank of Chile and Consensus Forecast data.
5. To facilitate comparison with previous periods, we consider one-year-ahead 
expected inflation. However, following the introduction of a steady-state inflation target 
in 2001, the monetary authority explicitly stated that its goal is to keep inflation within 
the target range in a horizon of twelve to twenty-four months.
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3. FREQUENCY OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT, CREDIBILITY, AND 
INDEXATION
The preliminary evidence presented in the previous section hints 
that there may, in fact, have been gains in monetary policy credibility 
during the disinflationary process carried out by the Central Bank 
of Chile in the 1990s. In this section, we perform a more detailed 
analysis of how this change in the macroeconomic environment may 
have changed the inflationary dynamics. We start by estimating a new 
Keynesian Phillips curve for Chile and performing some stability tests 
on some key semistructural parameters. We then evaluate whether 
the degree of import price rigidity may have changed in a manner 
consistent with the hypothesis that the credibility of the Chilean 
monetary policy regime has risen.6
3.1 The Phillips Curve and the Persistence of Inflation
We estimate a new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in which 
the parameters have a semistructural interpretation. We emphasize 
that the parameters are not completely structural. In fact, changes 
in the macroeconomic environment seem to have had an impact 
on the value of some of the deep parameters that characterize the 
NKPC (see also Rudd and Whelan, 2003, 2005). The fraction of firms 
optimally adjusting prices each period decreased at the end of the 
1990s, and the weight given to the announced inflation target by 
the firms that do not optimally adjust prices in a particular period 
has increased over the last few years. We argue that this evidence is 
consistent with the view that the Central Bank’s higher credibility 
in its commitment to price stability (low inflation) changed the way 
in which firms set prices. 
The theoretical NKPC comes from a standard model of monopolistic 
competitive firms that adjust prices infrequently.7 We extend the basic 
model in Galí and Gertler (1999) to allow for passive price adjustment 
for all firms that do not optimize each period. Firms thus change prices 
every period, either optimally or by following this passive adjustment. 
The logic behind this dual pricing mechanism is that the menu costs for 
6. García and Restrepo (2001) and Schimidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002) document 
the existence of a change in the pass-through coefficient for the Chilean economy using 
different setups. 
7. See Galí and Gertler (1999) for a full derivation of the NKPC. 
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price adjustments are not related to the cost of changing prices itself, 
but rather to all the costs that an optimizing procedure involves (such 
as collecting information on market conditions, costs, and forecasting). 
Given those menu costs, firms will go through an optimization process 
only infrequently (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).
This framework is appropriate for describing Chilean inflationary 
dynamics for two reasons. First, the notion of a passive adjustment 
is very plausible in a high-inflation environment—as in Chile in the 
early 1990s—where it is difficult to extract the information content of 
prices. Second, the passive adjustment setting allows us to formally 
introduce an indexation mechanism into the Phillips curve. In the 
case of Chile, indexation has been a prevalent phenomenon for many 
years (see Landerretche, Lefort, and Valdés, 2002). 
The passive adjustment mechanism for firms that do not optimally 
adjust their prices consists in upgrading prices in proportion to a 
geometric average of past inflation and the announced target for 
inflation. The passive adjustment rule can be expressed as follows: 
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,                                                       (1)
where Γt,i is the percentage change in price of a firm that is not able 
to optimally adjust between t and t + i, πt+j–1 is the inflation rate in 
t + j – 1, andπt j
tar
+  is the inflation target set by the authority for the 
period t + j. This updating rule implies that whenever firms do not 
receive a signal, they adjust their prices by a geometric average of 
the inflation target set by the authority and past inflation. Parameter 
κ is a measure of the degree of persistency of inflation and can be 
associated with the credibility of the target set by the authority. The 
larger this parameter, the larger the weight given to past inflation 
and the lower the weight given to the inflation target—and thus the 
lower the credibility of the announcement. The Phillips curve with 
the Calvo model and this updating rule is given by
ˆ ˆ ˆ π λξ γ π γ π ζ t t f t t b t t mc E = + + + + − 1 1 ,                                                      (2)
where ˆ π π π t t t
tar = −  corresponds to the deviation of inflation from 
the target, mct represents marginal costs, λ(κ, θ, β) = (1 – θ)(1 – θβ)/
[θ(1+κβ)], γf(κ, θ, β) = β/(1+κβ), and γb(κ, θ, β) = κ/(1+κβ). Parameter 
β is the subjective discount factor and ξ defines whether capital is 
mobile across firms (ξ=1) or firm specific (ξ≠1). The term ζt is a 
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function of changes in the inflation target.8 Notice that parameter 
κ defines the backward-looking component of the Phillips curve. 
In other words, this parameter is also a measure of the degree of 
indexation in the economy.
Parameter θ is the probability that a firm will keep the current 
price until the next period. It also corresponds to the share of firms that 
do not optimally adjust prices in a particular period. We assume that 
this parameter captures, to some extent, the credibility of monetary 
policy. In the standard Calvo model, the probability of adjusting 
prices—or the share of firms optimally setting prices each period—has 
no economic interpretation other than as a measure of the degree of 
price stickiness. In our case, we assume that firms will adjust prices 
more often (that is, a larger share of firms will optimally adjust prices 
each period) when future inflation is more uncertain and the central 
bank’s commitment regarding inflation is perceived to be weak.
Parameters θ, β, and κ are estimated using a generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimation with quarterly data from 1991:1 to 
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= zt 0,                                     (3)
where zt is a vector of instruments that includes three lags of the 
inflation deviation from target, the real marginal cost deviation from 
trend, and the output gap (from t – 3 to t – 5).9 
Benchmark results for the estimated hybrid model are presented 
in table 1. We give the estimated values of parameters θ, β, and λ 
under four different specification for the marginal cost—derived from 
a Cobb-Douglas technology, a technology with labor hoarding, a CES 
technology and a CES technology for an open economy—, and assuming 
alternatively that capital is freely mobile and firm specific. We also 
report the estimated value of parameter κ, which measures the degree 
to which firms index their prices to past inflation.
8. In the steady state, with a constant inflation target, ζt = 0. 
9. To check the relevance of the instrument set used in our regressions, we test 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all the instruments are jointly zero in the 
first stage of the estimation. The F statistic, the associated p value, and the adjusted 
R2 from the first stage of these regressions allowed us to reject the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are jointly irrelevant. The adjusted R2 is generally over 0.5.
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The estimated share of the backward-looking component, γb, is 
statistically significant in all specifications, and it is about 0.45. This 
figure is slightly smaller than Agénor and Bayraktar (2003) find 
for Chile in their study of the inflation dynamics in middle-income 
countries. These authors estimate a nonstructural Phillips curve that 
includes both backward- and forward-looking components; they find 
that the backward-looking component is about 0.52. Unlike our case, 
Agénor and Bayraktar use several lags of the output gap (up to three 
for Chile) as the driving force for inflation.
The estimated values for parameter θ under this hybrid specification 
of the NKPC lie in the range of 0.8 to 0.9. This implies that firms 
adjust prices every seven quarters, on average. In the case of discount 
factor, β, our empirical results indicate that the estimated value for 
this parameter is somewhat low. Our specification for marginal cost 
with firm-specific capital delivers a lower value for θ, implying shorter 
average duration of price stickiness, as in Galí, Gertler, and López-
Salido (2001). Finally, the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied 
for all cases. Table 1 also presents the results for the specification for 
marginal cost that assumes firm-specific capital (the results assuming 
capital mobility are similar).10
Parameter κ is consistently estimated in the range of 0.75 to 0.82, 
implying that within the sample period, firms gave more weight to 
past inflation than to inflation targets when passively adjusting their 
prices. These figures suggest a much stronger role for the backward-
looking component of inflation in the Chilean case than is estimated 
by Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) 
for the euro area. They are quite similar, however, to the estimates 
for the United States in those same two papers. 
We turn now to the issue of parameter stability. 11 Following 
Céspedes, Ochoa, and Soto (2005), we consider a predictive test for 
structural change with an unknown breakpoint developed by Ghysels 
and Hall (1990), Ghysels, Guay, and Hall (1997), and Guay (2003). This 
test consists in estimating the parameter vector for a first subsample 
and then evaluating the moment conditions for the second subsample 
10. We perform a robustness exercise to address the importance of the backward-
looking component of the Phillips curve, in which we incorporate additional lags of 
inflation to the hybrid model. Additional lags of inflation turn out to be insignificant, 
as does the sum of the three additional lags of inflation.
11. This issue has not been formally analyzed in the literature. Jondeau and Le 
Bihan (2005) test the stability of their Phillips curve estimates, but they only examine 
the reduced-form (linear) parameters and use Wald-type tests, which have some 
important drawbacks (as they point out).
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at these parameter values. The subsample is then increased by one 
observation at the time. Each time, the PR statistic (or predictive 
test) is constructed.12
Table 2 presents the estimated predictive tests (supremum: 
supPR; average: avgPR; and exponential: expPR), along with 
the date for which the largest PR test is obtained. The PR-type 
tests can be divided into a test of structural change for the vector 
of parameters and a test of the stability of the overidentifying 
restrictions (Sowell, 1996). We report the PR1-type statistic, which 
tests both parameter and overidentifying restriction stability, and 
the PR2-type tests for parameter variations only. The results show 
that we cannot reject the existence of a breakpoint for the four 
marginal cost specifications. Furthermore, the PR1 and PR2 tests 
consistently estimate the date of the breakpoint around the first 
quarter of 2001, which is close to the date that the inflation target 
reached its stationary annual value of 3 percent. We also report 
the estimated values of the parameter κ and the duration of price 
stickiness before the breakpoint date, κ1 and D1 respectively in the 
table. In most cases, the first subsample value of κ is larger than 
the estimated parameter using the whole sample, suggesting that 
after the breakpoint in 2001 firms have given a larger weight to 
inflation targets when updating their prices. Finally, we find that 
the estimated duration of price stickiness is smaller before the 
breakpoint, as expected.
These results are consistent with the findings of Hutchison and 
Walsh (1998), who provide evidence of a possible shift in the output-
inflation tradeoff in New Zealand after the implementation of the 
1989 Reserve Bank Act. In their case, both direct tests of parameter 
instability and inference from inflation forecast errors indicate that the 
1989 Act may have altered some fundamental economic relationships 
by changing the degree of central bank independence and the Reserve 
Bank’s commitment to price stability.
12. For our purposes, this approach has several advantages over alternative 
approaches like the Wald-type tests proposed by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and 
Ploberger (1994). First, we only use first subsample estimates of the parameters, which 
allows us to test for the presence of a break even when the second subsample contains 
few observations and parameter estimates are not feasible. A common drawback of 
Wald-type tests is that they cannot be applied to detect structural instability at the end 
of the sample. Second, we do not set a priori orthogonality conditions equal to zero in 
the second subsample, so we avoid rejecting stability when the parameters are, in fact, 
stable but there are certain types of misspecification (for example, omitted variables). 
A brief description of the test can be found in Céspedes, Ochoa, and Soto (2005).
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Figure 5. Price Rigidity: Phillips Curve (θ) 
Source: Authors' calculations.
To further assess the potential direction of the structural change 
in the inflationary process in the Chilean economy, we run a set of 
regressions for the NKPC starting with the period 1991:1–1997:4 and 
then adding one more observation at a time. For these calculations, 
we use real marginal costs computed using a production function with 
overhead labor and firm-specific capital. The results indicate that price 
rigidity, captured by the parameter θ, has increased in recent years 
(see figure 5). Specifically, the estimated duration of price rigidity 
went from two quarters in the period previous to 2000 to around three 
quarters for the whole period. We also find that the parameter that 
measures the degree by which firms adjust their current prices based 
on previous inflation (κ) has decreased over time (see figure 6).
The evidence presented here is consistent with the view that 
some parameters are policy dependent (Rudd and Whelan, 2005). The 
increase in the price rigidity parameter and the decrease in the degree 
of indexation to past inflation support the hypothesis that monetary 
policy in Chile has become more credible. These results are also in line 
with the empirical and theoretical view that a more credible monetary 
policy is negatively correlated with inflation persistence (see Taylor, 
2000; Sargent, 1999). 
3.2 Changes in the Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Broad empirical literature shows that the pass-through from the 
exchange rate to prices is not full in the short run. Import prices 
in various countries deviate from the law of one price (Campa and 
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Goldberg, 2002), and the response of CPI inflation to changes in the 
exchange rate is often less than one to one in the short run (Borensztein 
and De Gregorio, 1999; Goldfajn and Werlang, 2000). In this subsection, 
we provide new evidence on the evolution of the pass-through in Chile 
in the last fifteen years using the new Keynesian Phillips curve as 
our analytical framework (see Monacelli, 2003). 
The pass-through from the exchange rate to prices may be 
imperfect in the short run because of structural features of the 
market, as in Dornbusch (1977), or because of nominal rigidities. Given 
pricing-to-market behavior (Betts and Devereux, 1996), if a fraction 
of import prices are sticky in the domestic currency, then changes in 
the exchange rate will not be completely passed on to prices. In other 
words, the pass-through from the exchange rate to import prices will 
be incomplete. Therefore, changes in price rigidity will also imply 
changes in the exchange rate pass-through. 
Since we are interested in the pass-through as a macroeconomic 
phenomena, we estimate the effect of changes in the nominal exchange 
on imported goods inflation based on a sticky-price model similar to the 
one used to derive the Phillips curve in the previous section. Following 
Monacelli (2003), we assume that domestic retail firms buy different 
varieties of imported goods in the international market and later sell 
them domestically. We assume that each retail firm has monopoly 
power over a particular imported variety, and it adjusts its prices 
infrequently with probability of 1 – θM each period. Coefficient θM is a 
measure of nominal price rigidity in the import sector; it determines 
Figure 6. Weight of Past Inflation in the Passive Price 
Adjustment Rule (κ) 
Source: Authors' calculations.
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the degree of imperfect pass-though. The larger this coefficient, the 
less frequently prices are changed and the lower is the pass-through 
from nominal exchange rate movements into imported price inflation 
(see the appendix). 
A particular retail firm selling variety zM that is able to adjust 
its price in period t chooses a new price, P z M t
new
M , ( ), to maximize its 
expected profits: 
E
P z S P z
P





M t i M t i M
t i





















subject to the domestic demand for that variety, given by CM,t+i(zM). 
Variable St is the nominal exchange rate, and P z M t M ,
* ( ) is the 
international price of variety zM expressed in foreign currency. 
From the first-order condition for this problem, we can establish the 
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1 .                       (4)
wheres p t M t + ,
* is the logarithm of the price of imported goods abroad 
expressed in domestic currency, and pM,t is the domestic price of 
imported goods in the domestic market.
We estimate equation (4) by GMM, using an imports price index 
(the índice de valor unitario de importaciones, or IVUM) as a proxy 
for the price of imported goods in foreign currency. The domestic 
price of imported goods is proxied by the price index corresponding 
to tradable goods included in the CPI basket. Our measure of 
inflation thus corresponds to the quarterly change in the tradable 
goods price index. The specification in equation (4) assumes that 
the distribution service provided by retail firms does not require 
the use of any inputs.13 Our results indicate that the relative price 
of imports abroad is a strong driver of the tradables inflation rate, 
and the forward-looking component is also very relevant. Moreover, 
the coefficient associated with price rigidity, θM, is positive and 
significant (see table 3). This value yields an estimated duration of 
price stickiness of around five quarters.
13. Results under alternative specifications, in which labor is required to distribute 
the imported goods, are similar to the ones reported here.
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Table 3. Tradable Inflation Phillips Curve 
Parameter (1) (2) (3)
β 0.972 0.907 0.919
(0.01)* (0.00)* (0.01)*
θM 0.816 0.648 0.846
(0.05)** (0.00)* (0.04)**
λ 0.047 0.223 0.040
(0.03)** (0.01)* (0.02)**
Sample 1991:1–2005:4 1991:1–2000:4 1995:1–2005:4
J statistic 4.870 3.229 3.533
P value (0.99) (1.00) (1.00)
SupPR test 1287.22 276.01 2396.41
Estimated breakpoint 2000:1 1999:4 2003:1
Source: Authors' calculations.
* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses.
To test for potential structural breaks, we consider the predictive 
test for structural change discussed in the previous section. The supPR 
test points to a structural break around the first quarter of 2001. Again, 
to assess the scope of this change, we estimate a set of regressions 
starting with the period 1991:1–1997:4 and then adding one observation 
at a time. The results from this exercise indicate that the average price 
rigidity in the 1990s was close to 2.5 quarters, half the value for the 
whole sample (see figure 7). Also in table 3 we report results obtained 
when splitting the sample. Again, we find evidence that the frequency 
of imports price adjustments has decreased over time.14 
These results indicate that the short-run pass-through was lower 
after 1999, during the Chilean economy’s low-inflation period, than 
in the previous period. Taylor (2000) argues that the pass-through 
coefficient should be lower in low-inflation environments, as low 
inflation may be associated with less persistent changes in costs. From 
the perspective of our theoretical framework, we argue the higher 
credibility of monetary policy, interpreted as a credible commitment 
14. Although the resulting number of observations is low, we divided the sample into 
two parts: from 1991:1 to 1997:4 and from 1998:1 to 2005:4. We find results consistent 
with the hypothesis of a change in price rigidity. In particular, the average duration of 
price stickiness in the second period is almost twice as large as in the first period. 
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to low and stable inflation rate around 3 percent, has reduced the 
frequency of price changes.15
One special feature of the change in the pass-through coefficient 
in Chile is that it seems to have occurred not at the moment in which 
inflation rates reached low values (around 1998), but sometime later. We 
interpret this result as indicating that only when monetary policy was 
credible did the pass-through coefficient change. This evidence is related 
to the findings of Bailliu and Fujii (2004), who report that the exchange 
rate pass-through coefficients for a group of industrialized economies 
declined following the inflation stabilization in the early 1990s, but 
they did not decline following a similar episode in the early 1980s. One 
interpretation for this result is that the disinflationary process of the 
1990s was perceived as more credible than the previous one. 
4. CREDIBILITY AND MONETARY POLICY
The previous section showed that the frequency of price adjustments, 
the degree of indexation to past inflation, and the exchange rate pass-
through have decreased over time, especially after 2000. We interpreted 
this evidence as support for the view that monetary policy has become 
more credible over the last several years. 
Figure 7. Price Rigidity: Tradables Phillips Curve (θM) 
Source: Authors' calculations.
15. Céspedes and Valdés (2006) provide evidence that countries with more 
independent central banks, which are associated with a more credible monetary policy, 
have lower pass-through coefficients.
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A broad literature shows that when the monetary authority is not 
fully credible, its tradeoff between output and inflation stabilization is 
worse than when credibility is larger. In fact, in the simplest version of 
the new Keynesian Phillips curve, a fully credible stabilization process 
can be carried out without any output losses (Ball, 1995). 
In Céspedes and Soto (2005), we present a model for comparing 
the sacrifice ratio implied by different monetary policy rules under 
alternative assumptions regarding the credibility of a disinflationary 
shock. We show that if the central bank is strict in fulfilling its inflation 
target, then inflation stabilization may generate significant output 
losses and large sacrifice ratios for low credibility levels. Figure 8 
depicts the sacrifice ratio—that is, accumulated output losses relative 
to the accumulated reduction in inflation—for a disinflationary shock as 
a function of credibility, measured by a Kalman gain coefficient, under 
two alternative policy rules: a baseline Taylor rule and an alternative 
policy rule with a strong feedback response of the interest rate to 
deviation of inflation from the target.16 The figure clearly illustrates 
Figure 8. Sacrifice Ratio and Credibility
Source: Céspedes and Soto (2005). 
16. The model in Céspedes and Soto (2005) follows Erceg and Levin’s (2003) 
approach to model imperfect credibility, assuming that private agents must solve a 
signal extraction problem in order to sort out whether a shock to the inflation target is 
permanent or transitory. They use the Kalman filter to solve for the signal extraction 
problem. The larger the Kalman gain coefficient, the faster they understand the 
nature of the shock to the target (that is, the more credible is a permanent shock to 
the inflation target).
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how the sacrifice ratio falls as the credibility of the inflation target 
rises (that is, with a higher Kalman gain coefficient). The tougher 
rule has a higher sacrifice ratio than the baseline Taylor rule when 
credibility is low. As credibility increases, however, the sacrifice ratio 
of the alternative rule drops below the sacrifice ratio of the baseline 
policy rule. In other words, as credibility increases, a central bank can 
reduce inflation faster without having to sacrifice too much output.
In what follows, we investigate whether the way monetary policy 
is conducted in Chile has changed in line with the previous analysis. 
We estimate monetary policy interest rate rules for two periods that 
roughly coincide with the two phases described earlier: the first 
quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of 1997; and the first quarter 
of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2005. As mentioned, the first phase 
was characterized by short-run horizons for the inflation targets, a 
managed exchange rate, and a target for the current account. We 
capture these features by assuming that the real interest rate (rt) 
set by the Central Bank during the first period of inflation targeting 
was a function of current inflation, the output gap, and the current 
difference between the real exchange rate and its equilibrium level. 
We estimate the following relation:
r r r
g
t t t t
tar
y t
= − ( ) + + − ( ) − ( )





0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
ρ ρ ρ ω π π
ρ ω ρ
π,
, ( ( ) + ωe t
mis
t q u , , 0
                                      (5)
where gt–1 corresponds to the output gap in t – 1,qt
mis is the real 
exchange rate misalignment, and ut is a linear combination of 
prediction errors and policy innovations.17 Since the term ut could 
be correlated with actual values of inflation and the output gap, we 
estimate this relation using GMM, as suggested by Clarida, Galí, and 
Gertler (2000).
The results indicate that the specification of the monetary policy 
rule in equation (5) is a good description of monetary policy actions for 
the period 1991–97 (see table 4). The estimated coefficients have the 
17. The output gap measure corresponds to the difference between effective output 
and a trend measure for output. This trend measure is obtained using the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter. The real exchange rate misalignment corresponds to the difference 
between the effective real exchange rate and the equilibrium real exchange rate. The 
equilibrium real exchange rate is computed by applying the HP filter to the effective 
real exchange rate. A positive value for qt
mis implies that the real exchange rate is 
undervalued relative to its equilibrium level.
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expected sign and are significant in all cases. In addition to responding 
to deviations of inflation from the target, the Central Bank of Chile 
responded to deviations of output from its trend value and to the 
exchange rate. As discussed previously, the Central Bank also targeted 
the current account during this period.18
Table 4. Monetary Policy Rules: Chile 1991–2005a
Parameter (1) (2)
ρ0, ρ1 0.63 0.63
(0.06)* (0.04)*
ωπ,0, ωπ,1 0.35 1.84
(0.17)*** (0.28)*






J statistic 1.92 3.52
P value (0.98) (0.99)
Source: Authors' calculations.
* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
a. The dependent variable is the monetary policy real interest rate. The 
regressions are estimated using GMM. Regression 1 estimates parameters 
with subscript 1; regression 2 estimates parameters with subscript 2. The J 
statistic is the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (we report the p values 
in parentheses).Standard errors in parentheses.
When we include 1998–2005 in the sample, our estimations of 
the policy reaction function in equation (5) yield poor results. Most 
coefficients become insignificant or have the wrong sign (or both). This 
may reflect the change in the inflation-targeting framework starting 
in 1999. To explore the possibility of a structural change, we use the 
18. To test how this could have been reflected in the policy rule (other than through 
the exchange rate), we included the current account in some of our estimations. The 
coefficient associated with the current account balance turned out to be negative and 
significant, indicating that the Central Bank responded actively to changes in the 
current account. Increases in the current account deficit beyond the target level triggered 
increases in the interest rate to cool down domestic expenditure.
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predictive test proposed by Ghysels, Guay, and Hall (1997) and Guay 
(2003) and discussed in the context of the Phillips curve estimation 
above. The results of the test indicate that there is a structural break 
and that this break occurs around the first quarter of 2000.19
To account for this structural change, we estimate the following 
policy reaction function: 
r r r E t t t t t




+ − ( )
− + + 1 1
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1 1 1 1 1 4 4
1
ρ ρ ρ ω π π
ρ ω
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y y t t g u , , 1 1 − +
                             (6)
using quarterly data from 1998:1 to 2005:4. We do not split the 
sample exactly at the breakpoint detected with the PR test in order 
to have enough data to estimate the monetary policy rule for the 
second phase.
The estimations of this last policy rule indicate that in the full-
fledged inflation-targeting phase, the monetary authority has become 
more forward looking in terms of inflation. In contrast to the previous 
phase, the evidence indicates that the Central Bank is willing to allow 
deviation of current inflation from the target as long as it does not have 
an impact on future inflation. Additionally, the coefficient associated 
with inflation, ωπ,1, increased relative to the corresponding coefficient 
in the interest rate rule for the previous inflation-targeting phase. 
This stronger response of the interest rate to inflation deviations is 
consistent with a central bank that takes advantage of an improved 
trade-off between inflation and output, possibly as a consequence of 
higher credibility or commitment to controlling inflation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have provided new evidence of changes in the 
dynamics of the Chilean inflationary process in recent years. Based 
on a new Keynesian Phillips curve, we showed that price rigidity 
has increased in recent years, while the degree of indexation in the 
economy—based on past inflation—has decreased. We also showed 
that the exchange rate pass-through into tradable goods inflation 
has decreased. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the 
19. The PR test results were as follows: supPR: 174.48; avgPR: 71.27; and exp PR: 
83.94. The tests were calculated using a Newey-West covariance matrix robust to serial 
correlation up to twelve lags. 
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credibility of monetary policy has increased over time. As monetary 
policy has become more credible, costly price adjustments have been 
carried out less frequently, and the prevalence of indexation based on 
past inflation has decreased.
These changes in the inflationary process, triggered by an 
enhanced credibility of monetary policy, may have had significant 
repercussions on the way monetary policy is implemented in Chile. In 
particular, as the Central Bank improves its credibility, it may fight 
inflation deviation from target strongly without having to sacrifice 
much output. In this context, the paper also presented evidence on a 
structural change in the policy rule that characterizes the conduction 
of the monetary policy. Our results are consistent with the idea that 
over the last several years, Chilean monetary policy has been operating 
in an improved credibility environment. The monetary policy rule has 
become more forward-looking in terms of inflation and more aggressive 
in fighting deviations of inflation from the target.
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APPENDIX
Frequency of Price Adjustment and Pass-Though
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When we normlaize pM t ,
* = 1, the law of motion for the domestic 
price is given by





















where λM = [(1 – θM)(1 – θMβ)]/θM. For simplicity, let us assume that the 
exchange rate follows a random walk process. Let δ1 and δ2 = (β/δ1) be 
the unstable and stable roots of the solution for pM,t.20 We can write 
the solution for the domestic currency price of imported goods as
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Under flexible prices, λM → ∞, δ1 → ∞, and (δ1/λM) → 1. Then, 
the pass-through elasticity is unitary. If prices are completely sticky, 
however, then λM = 0 and δ1 = 1. In this case, the pass-through 
coefficient is zero. By a continuity argument, the pass-through 
coefficient is increasing in λM and, therefore, decreasing in θM. 
 20. Coefficient δ1 is the solution to δ1
2 – δ1(1 + λM + β) + β = 0.
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